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Abstract 
Prompted in part by constrained national budgets, European 
governments are increasingly partnering with the private sector 
to underwrite the costs of constructing and operating public 
hospitals and other health care facilities and delivering 
services. Through such public-private partnerships, governments 
hope to avoid up-front capital expenditure and to harness 
private-sector efficiencies, while private-sector partners aim 
for a return on investment. Our research indicates that to date, 
experience with these partnerships has been mixed. Early models 
of these partnerships – for example, in which a private firm 
builds a hospital and carries out building maintenance, which we 
term an “accommodation-only” model – arguably have not met 
expectations for achieving greater efficiencies at lower costs. 
Newer models described in this article offer greater 
opportunities for efficiency gains, but are administratively 
 
 
harder to set up and manage. Given the shortages in public 
capital for new infrastructure, it seems likely that the 
attractiveness of these partnerships to European governments 
will grow. 
 
 
The use of private finance for key public infrastructure 
projects, especially in transportation and utilities, grew 
almost fourfold globally from the early to the late 2000s.(1,2) 
These partnerships have also been a growing part of health care 
infrastructure investment, particularly across Europe.(3-5)  
 
Different variants of public-private partnerships have involved  
the use of private finance and for-profit organizations to 
design, finance, build, and maintain hospitals and other 
infrastructure, and occasionally to provide operational 
services.  A typical project might be the reconstruction of an 
outdated public hospital by a private company and with private 
funding. In the United Kingdom alone there have been more than 
100 such projects, ranging from a private finance commitment for 
US$15 million for a small community hospital to more than US$2 
billion for the redevelopment of the Royal London and St 
Bartholomew’s Hospitals in London.  
 
 
 
In this article we discuss lessons for policy makers and health 
care providers from the use of public-private partnerships in 
Europe to develop and deliver health care infrastructure-- 
buildings, large technology systems, and associated services. We 
suggest that the continuing economic crisis, with its consequent 
fiscal constraints, is likely to stimulate European countries to 
increase the use of these partnerships.(6) 
Major investment in Europe’s health care infrastructure is 
needed, particularly in European Union countries and candidate 
countries with health infrastructure inherited from the former 
Soviet era. Typical of this situation is Slovakia, where an 
analysis indicates that hospitals are “unsatisfactory and old 
fashioned, which leads to their ineffective management.”(7) 
Similarly, Western European countries with more modern 
infrastructure need to redevelop hospitals as health care 
service models change and the need for inpatient beds 
declines.(8,9) 
The construction and maintenance of European health care 
facilities have generally been paid for by the state or by 
state-controlled entities. However, several European countries, 
such as France and Spain, have long experience of public-private 
partnership arrangements for major transportation 
infrastructure, and in recent years there has been an extension 
of these partnerships to health care (Exhibit 1). In 2010 health 
 
 
care partnership deals worth US$3.6 billion were signed, 
representing 16 percent of the value of all new public-private 
partnership contracts.(10) 
Variety In Public-Private Partnership Models 
The public-private partnership approach covers a wide range 
of models, from outsourcing to nearly full privatization. 
Broadly, it involves a “risk-sharing relationship between the 
public and private sectors with the objective of bringing about 
a desired public policy outcome.”(4) In essence, public-private 
partnerships are just another form of raising funds. In 
principle, the public-sector entity, such as a hospital or 
health authority, could borrow to undertake capital investment 
on its own account. In partnership arrangements, the private-
sector partner is typically responsible for arranging financing. 
Either way, the reimbursement of the debt falls on the public 
purse. 
Many combinations of public-private mix are possible for 
health care assets, with considerable diversity in the way risk 
management, financing, and payment mechanisms are structured 
(Exhibit 2). Partnership variants exist along a spectrum, 
determined by the degree to which various services and 
facilities are “bundled” within the contract.  
At one end, an “accommodation-only” model embraces only the 
building and related services--for example, a hospital facility, 
 
 
the associated “hard” facilities management (building 
maintenance), and sometimes “soft” facilities management 
(nonclinical services such as cleaning and catering). 
This accommodation-only model has been followed in the United 
Kingdom, where it is known as the Private Finance Initiative, 
and also in Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Canada, and 
Australia. The model largely takes the form of an integrated 
contract covering design, construction, and finance for the 
infrastructure and related services such as maintenance for the 
life of the building. The financial structure is based on long-
term payments, typically over thirty years, by the public 
hospital authority to the private partner. 
A second model, which is in effect an extension of the 
accommodation model, is used in Portugal. It involves twin 
“special purpose vehicles”, or dedicated companies. One, dubbed 
the InfraCo, is responsible for development and management of 
the buildings, and the other, the ClinCo, is responsible for 
clinical services. The key contractual relationships are between 
the Ministry of Health, the hospital authority, and the InfraCo, 
with which there is a thirty-year contract, and the ClinCo, with 
which there as a seven- or ten-year contract. 
A third model takes the form of a franchise issued to a 
private for-profit entity, but with strict control by a Ministry 
of Health or other public authority. The levels of financial 
 
 
reimbursement for medical procedures received by a franchisee 
are the same as for public or other nonprofit hospitals also in 
the system. Furthermore, there is no “cream-skimming” of 
profitable patients; any member of the population must be 
accepted for any health care intervention offered by the 
hospital concerned.(4) 
Germany, Finland, and other European countries are 
experimenting with this fourth model. In Germany, private 
companies--notably, Helios Kliniken and Rhön Klinikum--are 
buying financially stressed municipal hospitals and occasionally 
university hospitals and are running them under such a franchise 
from the regional states. Each of these companies partly or 
fully owns and manages more than fifty hospitals spread across 
Germany; other franchisees are smaller. 
Finally, in a fifth model, public-private partnerships can 
involve full-service provision, in which a private company--via 
franchise--delivers both the hospital services and the primary 
care for a geographical area from its own facilities. The 
company can try to direct patients to whichever level of care--
primary or secondary--is cheapest, with regulatory and payment 
mechanisms in place to maintain quality (see the example from 
Spain discussed below). 
 
Advantages And Disadvantages Of Public-Private Partnerships 
 
 
There is both support for and substantial criticism of the 
use of these partnerships in health care. Exhibit 3 summarizes 
the generally recognized advantages and disadvantages.  
Potential benefits are said to include the ability to allow 
health care providers to concentrate on clinical services, 
instead of managing infrastructure, and increased efficiency in 
project delivery. For both governments and health care 
organizations, public-private partnerships also are seen as a 
potential solution for funding shortages due to budget 
constraints or other factors. 
There are, however, concerns. One of these is the 
possibility that public-private partnerships may restrict 
competitive behavior. Even in large countries with an active 
public-private partnership market, projects can be so large that 
only a few organizations may be able to bid for them and manage 
subsequent service delivery over extended periods of time. 
Transaction costs are high during setup and the operational life 
of the facility, which only a few organizations are able to 
bear.  
Another concern is possible lack of integration between the 
clinical models of care and the infrastructure and equipment 
that should support the clinical models, making it hard to align 
incentives between the parties involved to achieve high performance. 
 
 
The United Kingdom’s version of public-private 
partnerships--the Private Finance Initiative--is the classic 
example of an “accommodation-only” model, providing the 
buildings, perhaps some medical equipment, and the long-term 
maintenance of the financed items. It has been criticized on 
both the counts above, as well as over the high cost of the debt 
incurred when compared to government borrowing or bond 
issues.(11,12) 
Although there have been well-publicized public-private 
partnership failures, such as the Latrobe Regional Hospital in 
Australia, no public-private partnership hospitals have become 
bankrupt so far in Europe because of problems faced by health 
care organizations in servicing the debt.(13) However, several of 
the United Kingdom’s Private Finance Initiative hospitals are 
currently reporting serious financial stress.(14) 
Lessons From Public-Private Partnerships Experience 
Most of the more extensive public-private partnership 
models, such as those in Spain, Finland and Germany, are too 
recent for detailed longer-term evaluation . However, the UK 
experience of accommodation-only partnerships, covering 
buildings and related services, provides pointers to discuss 
performance in four broad areas: modernizing and creating health 
care infrastructure; improving the efficiency and quality of 
 
 
care; sharing risk to stimulate innovation and performance 
improvement; and stimulating innovation.(15) 
Modernizing And Creating Infrastructure 
The United Kingdom initiated the trend toward use of 
public-private partnerships in health care. The Private Finance 
Initiative, established in the mid 1990s in health care, was 
partly about modernizing outmoded hospital facilities more 
quickly than would have been feasible under conventional public 
funding and procurement models. Between 1997 and 2009, 101 of 
135 new hospital projects were completed under the Private 
Finance Initiative,(12) driven in part by a lack of alternative 
sources of funding but also by an overt political decision in 
favor of the model irrespective of whether other choices were 
workable.(16) 
Other examples of using public-private partnerships to 
modernize health care infrastructure come from Italy, France, 
Spain, and Portugal, where such arrangements have been used to 
construct major hospitals. Similarly, Central European and post-
Soviet states have major hospital infrastructure renewal plans, 
although so far no big realized projects.  
Romania has experimented with small schemes for radiology 
and imaging(3) and for dialysis clinics.(17) The Czech government 
has indicated its interest in public-private partnerships for 
 
 
hospital services.(18,19) Poland has agreed to the first of several 
public-private partnership health care schemes.(20)  
The largest health care infrastructure program by far is in 
Russia, where it is claimed that about $380 billion will be 
invested between 2010 and 2020.(21) The private sector is expected 
to contribute most of the financing, and several public-private 
partnership hospitals are currently in the preparation stage,(22) 
although the program has also faced legal problems.(23) 
 
Improving Efficiency And Quality Of Care 
Proponents of public-private partnerships argue that the 
use of such partnerships raises the efficiency and quality of 
infrastructure delivery because payments can be linked to 
performance or achievement of quality targets. Governments often 
claim that public-private partnerships will secure better value 
for money than traditional public procurement options can 
achieve. 
The UK experience is instructive. There is evidence that 
most Private Finance Initiative hospitals were completed close 
to on time, on budget, and meeting all specifications.(24) 
However, these conclusions must be interpreted with care, since 
the comparison is usually made for costs incurred only after 
contract signature--a stage at which such costs will probably 
have been identified. In the case of the Private Finance 
 
 
Initiative, this stage is, on average, later than for public 
projects because of the lengthy time involved in project 
development and negotiation. 
Another inquiry concluded that project construction and 
quality are not unambiguously better under the Private Finance 
Initiative.(12) Others have argued that “soft” facilities 
management, such as for ancillary services like cleaning and 
catering, provides lower value for money than in non-Private 
Finance Initiative hospitals.(11) Around 20 percent of hospital 
trusts were dissatisfied with the maintenance services provided 
within their Private Finance Initiative contracts.(16) On balance, 
evidence that the UK program has delivered timely projects with 
high quality and low operating costs is, at best, ambiguous. 
Portugal’s public-private partnership program--the second-
largest relative to the size of a country’s health sector--was 
stimulated in part by concerns about below-standard performance 
and cost overruns in public hospitals procured under traditional 
contracts. The government wished to introduce competing clinical 
providers and new procurement models, and it believed that 
operational efficiency gains from public-private partnerships 
would subsequently spread to other hospitals.  
Between 2004 and 2008 four new partnership hospital 
projects were launched, which included private delivery of 
clinical services in addition to construction and management of 
 
 
the buildings.(25) However, the complexity of these contracts and 
a lack of interest by banks in taking clinical performance risk 
led the government to revert to a UK-style accommodation-only 
model for the “second wave” of partnerships initiated in 2008.(26)  
Although there is confidence in Portugal that the new 
hospitals will generate efficiency savings, this remains to be 
demonstrated since a full post-construction audit has not yet 
taken place. 
Risk Sharing 
A fundamental principle behind public-private partnerships 
is that risk is allocated efficiently between private and public 
organizations. Risk should be allocated to the party that is 
best able to control it, or that requires the minimum risk 
premium. This, in theory, should drive innovation to achieve 
cost efficiencies and greater certainty of success, because the 
parties bearing the risk have an incentive to manage it more 
efficiently. 
The private-sector partner needs to manage the risk whether 
it concerns construction or operation. “Bundling” together the 
infrastructure and future maintenance should theoretically give 
the main contractor incentives to deliver reduced whole-life 
costing and performance improvements. Put simply, the contractor 
will carry the responsibility for the facility, not just on 
handover to a client but for decades beyond. 
 
 
Under public-private partnerships, some operational risks 
that traditionally rest with the hospital--those relating to 
inflation in maintenance and operational costs--are transferred 
to the private consortium. But major risks arising from 
technical obsolescence, changing regulations or policies, and 
unidentified future health care needs--such as falling or 
shifting clinical demand--generally remain with the public 
hospital authorities. 
The widespread criticisms of the experience of risk 
allocation under the UK Private Finance Initiative are 
important, given that the majority of European public-private 
partnerships have been developed using the UK model as a 
template. This model has been widely evaluated and is said to 
have failed to achieve good value for money from risk transfer 
to the private sector.(12) In other words, public-sector 
organizations pay a significant premium for the contractually 
stipulated risk transfer to the private sector, but still 
ultimately bear health project risks if the private-sector 
company is unable to deliver the project.  
What the UK experience exposes is that building health care 
infrastructure inevitably involves risks. Public-private 
partnerships may help ensure whole-life cost control, because 
this is usually contractible and can largely be captured by the 
private-sector partner. However, there is a trade-off against 
 
 
quality and flexibility--crucially important for hospitals as 
health care practice evolves, but much harder to specify in the 
contract.  
What’s more, although the potential alignment of incentives 
between the parties to deliver improved performance may well be 
greater in public-private partnership models that embrace 
buildings and nonclinical and clinical services, this alignment 
is at the expense of increased contractual and financial 
complexity.(27) 
Stimulating Innovation 
Finally, the United Kingdom’s Private Finance Initiative 
program suggests that innovation in design and construction has 
not been encouraged. When the program was developed, it was 
emphasized that the need for whole-life costing would stimulate 
innovation in buildings. However, research on early Private 
Finance Initiative hospital projects suggests that the model 
failed to achieve this result.(15)  
First, because design was carried out concurrently with 
contract bidding, open discussion of new ideas was constrained 
by the consortium’s fear that it might lose the project in the 
next phase of the process of bidding for the project. Second, 
final risk allocation occurred too early in the bidding process, 
limiting the opportunities for innovative thinking as the 
 
 
project unfolded. In the circumstances, contractors played safe 
and offered designs that they could guarantee to deliver. 
Future Directions In European Health Care Public-Private 
Partnerships 
Funding 
Future development of health care public-private 
partnerships in Europe will be shaped both by the effects of the 
immediate financial exigencies and by longer-term challenges in 
meeting future health and social needs. The public expenditure 
squeeze may motivate governments to choose a private financing 
route for health care capital investment and selected medical 
services.  
Currently, funding anywhere in Western countries for major 
infrastructure projects is proving expensive and hard to obtain. 
Banks are increasingly risk averse and are seeking higher 
margins to cover themselves.(28) In the longer term, though, 
public-private partnerships are fundamentally an attractive 
market for investing institutions, especially pension funds. A 
prolonged economic downturn could provide investors with greater 
incentives to participate, to secure predictable income from the 
rising and relatively stable demand for health care.(29) 
Rising public pension costs in aging societies provide 
another possible indirect stimulus to the development of public-
private partnership structures, this time from the perspective 
 
 
of the desirability of creating financial assets. Governments, 
concerned with looming entitlements, may have little choice but 
to try to pass on more of their pension, and possibly some 
health care, commitments to households to purchase and manage 
personal assets through increased private saving.  
The financial institutions serving the household sector, 
particularly pension funds, will need assets to match these 
increased liabilities over the long term, and many of these 
income-generating capital investments could be public-private 
partnerships. Health care capital investment, providing a 
relatively stable if limited return, could well be part of the 
mix of these assets--and conveniently one that to some extent is 
correlated to the services being demanded. 
Developing New Care Models 
Another factor influencing the future of European health 
care public-private partnerships is the extent to which 
governments see them as a way of solving broader problems in 
care delivery. One report suggests that the partnerships will 
increasingly move from “replacing crumbling inpatient structures 
to managing care delivery.”(30) This shift will require the 
delivery of flexible infrastructure that is more closely linked 
to health care services and outcomes. Greater sophistication may 
therefore be needed in the design of public-private 
 
 
partnerships, particularly where the boundaries around which 
services are included within the contract’s scope are drawn. 
The more extensive public-private partnership models appear 
to be pointing the way. An example is Coxa Hospital, in Tampere, 
Finland, where existing elective orthopedic services have been 
consolidated into a new hospital.(9) The public-private 
partnership involves a private company with yearly contracts, 
via the local university hospital, from municipalities, which 
are responsible for purchasing health care in Finland.  
The arrangement embraces both physical infrastructure and 
clinical services, in the form of surgical replacement of upper 
and lower limb joints. Significant process and safety 
improvements are said to have resulted--notably, reduced time to 
prepare operating theaters, significantly lower infection rates, 
shorter lengths-of-stay in hospital, and less readmission for 
revisions of operations.(31)  
The partnership was funded mostly by project finance debt 
and is now making modest profit distributions to the public-
sector owners of the equity in the project.(31) The local health 
planning district is now looking at introducing this model for 
other clinical-specific facilities, including cardiology and 
ophthalmology, with new “focus hospitals” sharing common 
services with the university hospital. 
 
 
Another example, extending the idea of bundling services 
even beyond the hospital, is that of Ribera Salud, in the 
Valencia region in Spain.(9) Initially, a consortium in the Alzira 
local area health department built a hospital only, but it faced 
insufficient income to cover costs, as a result of overly 
optimistic pricing to win the contract and underestimated cost 
inflation. The consortium was obliged to renegotiate its 
contract with the Valencia region health authority, and the 
scope of the partnership was extended from purely hospital care 
to a full primary and secondary care service. 
The current, renegotiated model of the principal company 
involved (Ribera Salud) has been rolled out to other health 
departments of the region. It is innovative in several ways. 
Payments use a “capitation” model in which the regional health 
authority makes a standard payment for each member of the 
population in a single local area forming a defined catchment 
area. The payments are set so that the cost to the public purse 
is lower than that previously incurred under purely public-
sector provision or in other comparable areas. Furthermore, the 
terms of the contract discourage the consortium from reducing 
the volume or quality of health care services provided to its 
catchment population, since costs incurred by patients traveling 
outside the concession are charged to the hospital company, and 
there are disincentives to offering care to non-catchment 
 
 
citizens. An initial review of the health care outcomes shows 
impressive results in a range of indicators such as 
significantly reduced delays in waiting for surgery and MRI / 
CAT scans, reduced average hospital stays, lower readmission 
rates, and increased rates of day and outpatient surgery.(32) 
Despite the apparent successes in these examples, the 
extension of public-private partnerships into a wider range of 
services beyond the infrastructure is by no means 
straightforward, because of the two trade-offs mentioned above.  
The first is alignment of incentives against complexity: 
Managing a myriad of relationships across private and public 
boundaries and over extended periods in extensive models is 
administratively demanding. The second is cost against quality: 
Identifying ex ante, and monitoring ex post, the level of 
quality that partnership parties are required to achieve in 
performing their contractual obligations is difficult when 
“quality” is noncontractible and hard to observe. 
Payment Systems 
Ensuring that public-private partnerships deliver what they 
promise requires thought on how their payment systems should be 
designed. There are major differences between direct payment 
models for the infrastructure alone, focusing on the 
availability of facilities and performance in delivering 
facilities management (for example, the United Kingdom’s Private 
 
 
Finance Initiative program), and indirect payment models such as 
the capitation approach deployed in Ribera Salud in Spain--
somewhat similar to a US accountable care organization, but 
under tight state regulation. Here, with money following the 
patient throughout, patients have more freedom to choose their 
preferred provider with the highest service and care standards, 
thus giving the health care organization incentives to deliver 
the highest performance. 
Conclusion 
We have argued in this article that public-private 
partnerships in health care are only peripherally about 
perceived private-sector efficiencies, easier finance, or the 
removal of expenditure from national balance sheets. They are, 
or at least should be, much more about ensuring that risks 
arising from the development and operation of health care 
infrastructure are optimally allocated between public and 
private partners, thereby reducing the risk premium. Bundling 
activities and using the payment mechanism to create incentives 
for high performance by the different contractual parties is one 
theoretical way of achieving this result. 
Until now, public-private partnership arrangements have 
been most successfully realized in those utility sectors in 
which service quality can be clearly specified, measured, and 
guaranteed. But this is challenging in health care, where 
 
 
outcomes are harder to measure and public-interest objectives 
can clash with the cost-saving behavior of a private party. 
The partnership examples in health care that have bundled 
infrastructure, nonclinical and clinical services hint at 
promising health care and economic outcomes. However, lessons 
need to be translated into a more refined understanding of how 
best to achieve this result by creating incentive and risk 
management mechanisms acceptable to all parties, given that 
extending the partnerships within a project to include clinical 
services adds an additional layer of complexity. 
Public-private partnerships will not always be the best 
option--the risk of being locked into an inefficiently designed 
contractual arrangement is high. But they remain very much a 
prominent feature of health care discourse in Europe. The 
European Commission promotes the use of the public-private 
partnership instrument across many sectors, and the developing 
concept of “European Project Bonds” is compatible with this 
approach. A more robust understanding of their limits and 
possibilities is therefore vital. 
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Exhibit list: 
Exhibit 1 (table) 
Caption: Location And Features Of Public-Private Partnerships 
For Health Care Project Financing In Selected European Countries 
Source/notes: SOURCES Adapted from Barlow J, Roehrich J, Wright S. 
De facto privatization or a renewed role for the EU? Paying for 
Europe’s healthcare infrastructure in a recession. J R Soc Med. 
2010;103:51—5. Some figures are based on Survey of Project Finance 
in Healthcare sector, Finlombarda, 2009 May. NOTE PPP is public-
private partnership. [Author: What does * denote?] 
 
Exhibit 2 (table) 
Caption: Models Of Public-Private Partnership Structures In 
Hospital Construction And Other Health Facilities 
Source/notes: SOURCE Authors’ analysis. NOTES PFI is Private 
Finance Initiative in the United Kingdom. Portugal Wave 1 
schemes (prior to 2008) were more all-embracing, including 
infrastructure and clinical services; Wave 2 schemes were less 
innovative and simpler, as they only included the construction 
and operation of facilities and ancillary services.  [please 
explain--not in text]. 
 
Exhibit 3 (table) 
Caption: Advantages And Disadvantages Of Public-Private 
Partnerships 
Source/notes: SOURCE Authors’ analysis. NOTES Some exemplar 
references are in the Notes in text. Others are in the online 
Appendix. To access the Appendix, click on the Appendix link in 
the box to the right of the article online. In column 1, a plus 
sign denotes an advantage, and a minus sign denotes a 
disadvantage. 
 
 
 
EXHIBITS 
Exhibit 1: Location And Features Of Public-Private Partnerships 
For Health Care Project Financing In Selected European Countries 
 
Country 
Predominant 
health care 
finance 
source 
Role of private capital in 
infrastructure and services 
provision 
Number of 
PPPs Value of PPPs 
Finland Tax Experimenting with 
buildings/maintenance and 
clinical partnerships 
1 <$100 million 
France Social health 
insurance 
Some buildings/maintenance 
partnerships 
16 $1.6 billion 
Germany Social health 
insurance 
Growth in for-profit provision 
under state concession; mostly 
state grants for capital 
expenditure; partnership 
experiments 
24 $2.1 billion 
Italy Tax Small private sector; some 
buildings/maintenance 
partnerships 
71 $5.7 billion 
Poland Social health 
insurance 
Buildings/maintenance 
partnerships 
1 $40 million 
Portugal Tax Buildings/maintenance and 
clinical partnerships; now 
buildings/maintenance only 
8 $4.6 billion 
Spain Tax Some buildings/maintenance 
partnerships and “full-service” 
partnerships 
19 $2.3 billion 
Sweden Tax One major contract under 
construction 
1 $2.1 billion 
United 
Kingdom 
Tax Small private elective sector; 
major buildings/maintenance 
program 
146 $25.8 billion 
 
SOURCES Adapted from Barlow J, Roehrich J, Wright S. De facto 
privatization or a renewed role for the EU? Paying for Europe’s 
healthcare infrastructure in a recession. J R Soc Med. 2010;103:51—5. 
Some figures are based on Survey of Project Finance in Healthcare 
sector, Finlombarda, 2009 May. NOTE PPP is public-private 
partnership. [Author: What does * denote?] 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 2: Models Of Public-Private Partnership Structures In 
Hospital Construction And Other Health Facilities 
 
Model Brief description 
“Public-public partnership” 
(example: certain Spanish 
projects) 
A special-purpose publicly owned company, largely financed by limited-
recourse commercial debt, has responsibility to deliver facilities, with 
the state continuing to provide medical services 
Accommodation-only: often 
via “design, build, finance, 
operate” (DBFO) or “build, 
own, operate, transfer” 
(BOOT) schemes 
(examples: UK’s PFI; also 
used in France, Spain, 
Portugal Wave 2, Italy, 
Sweden, Australia, and 
elsewhere) 
A private consortium designs, builds and operates infrastructure 
facilities based on a public authority’s specified requirements, often 
as an output rather than input specification 
In the DBFO model, the private sector also finances the facility, typically 
via high “gearing” (proportions of debt); the limited amounts of equity 
can include the public sector, with mechanisms to control any 
conflicts of interest; the public authority purchases services for a 
fixed period, after which ownership reverts to the public authority 
Twin accommodation/clinical 
services joint venture 
(example: Portugal Wave 
1) 
The infrastructure element is like an accommodation-only model 
A clinical services company with different, shorter-term financing 
provides medical services and has a contractual and shareholding 
relationship to the asset provider 
Franchising (example: 
German private hospital 
companies) 
A public authority licenses a private company to develop (finance, build, 
and manage, inclusive of medical services) a replacement for a 
public hospital 
“Full-service public-private 
partnerships” (example: 
Ribera Salud, Spain) 
A private contractor builds and operates a hospital and some or all of 
the area’s associated community primary care provision, with a contract 
to provide care for a defined population 
 
SOURCE Authors’ analysis. NOTES PFI is Private Finance 
Initiative in the United Kingdom. Portugal Wave 1 and Wave 2 
denote [please explain--not in text]. 
 
 
 
Exhibit 3: Advantages And Disadvantages Of Public-Private 
Partnerships 
Advantages and disadvantages Brief description Exemplar references 
Solution for public-sector capital 
shortage (+)  
Public-private partnership 
arrangements may deliver an asset 
that might be difficult to finance  
National Audit Office (Note 25 
in text); Broadbent and 
Laughlin (Appendix) 
Reduces cost of capital (+) or 
higher capital costs (-) 
Mixed results from prior studies  Liebe and Pollock (Note 12 in 
text); National Audit Office 
(Note 25 in text); Ball et al. 
(Appendix); Gaffney et al. 
1999a (Appendix); Gaffney et 
al. 1999b (Appendix) 
Health care providers can 
concentrate on clinical services 
(+) 
Nonclinical services (such as 
maintenance and security) are left 
with the private contractor 
Finlayson (Appendix) 
Introducing private-sector 
efficiency (+) 
Project delivery on time and on 
budget; most contracts are fixed 
price; ongoing maintenance and 
transparent life-cycle costs 
Finlayson (Appendix); Hodgson 
et al. (Appendix); Flinders 
(Appendix) 
Adoption of new technology and 
management (+) or stifling of 
innovation (-) 
Incentivizing performance by 
specifying service levels; 
innovation and good design 
through output specifications 
Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser 
(Note 16 in text); National 
Audit Office (Note 25 in text) 
Higher transaction, monitoring 
and set-up costs (-) 
Complex, long-term contracts and 
inter-organizational relationships 
need to be set up and managed; 
reduced contract flexibility as 
contracts are difficult to change 
and monitor 
Lonsdale (Appendix); Dixon et 
al. (Appendix); Entwistle et al. 
(Appendix); Pollock et al. 
(Appendix) 
Lack of integration between 
clinical models and 
infrastructure design (-) 
Responsibility for infrastructure and 
clinical services mostly not 
provided by one organization so 
important to align incentives 
Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser 
(Note 16 in text) 
Difficult relationship management 
over extended periods of time (-) 
Need to manage a wide network 
(including banks, suppliers, 
consultants) over time periods of 
up to 30 years  
Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser 
(Note 16 in text); Domberger 
et al. (Appendix); Zheng et al. 
(Appendix) 
Risk allocation (+/-) Allocation of risks to party best able 
to manage them; ultimate risk lies 
with public sector; increased 
commercial risks due to long-term 
and high contract value 
National Audit Office (Note 25 
in text); Ball et al. (Appendix); 
Bing et al. (Appendix); 
Deloitte (Appendix) 
 
SOURCE Authors’ analysis. NOTES Full citations for exemplar 
references are in the Notes in text or in the online Appendix. 
To access the Appendix, click on the Appendix link in the box to 
the right of the article online. In column 1, a plus sign 
denotes an advantage, and a minus sign denotes a disadvantage. 
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